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Japanese Agricultural Policy Studies: 
the State of the Field
James BRADY?
Abstract
 With Trans-Pacifi c Partnership (TPP) negotiations ongoing, agriculture is at the centre of public policy 
debates in Japan. Japan’s protectionist agricultural policy has been examined from a number of 
perspectives, including political economy and political science. This paper presents an analytical overview 
of the most important strands in the previous literature, and also of several recent studies which offer fresh 
insights into the determinants of Japan’s agricultural policy. The paper draws together these various 
strands to create a more complete picture of current academic approaches to agricultural policy in Japan, 
and highlights the most fertile areas for future research.
Keywords :  Japan, Agriculture, Protectionism, Preferences, Food Security
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1. Introduction
 Agricultural policy is one of the most hotly contested areas of contemporary Japanese politics. The Abe 
administration’s decision in 2013 to enter negotiations for the proposed Trans Pacifi c Partnership (TPP) free 
trade agreement has once again exposed sharp cleavages between large business and other interests who wish 
to see extensive liberalisation of markets including agriculture in Japan, and those who wish to protect the 
rice-focused agricultural sector in its present form. While economic studies are most frequently cited in public 
debates, there have been a range of academic studies across a number of disciplines which have examined the 
origins and continuation of the highly protectionist policy regime in Japanese agriculture. This paper provides 
a critical review of the most important strands of this literature. It also examines some of the frontier research 
relating to Japanese agricultural policy, including individual-level trade-policy preference determinants, and 
the application of Foucault’s idea of governmentality to Japanese fi sh policy. Drawing together these various 
approaches allows us to deepen our understanding of the multitude of factors shaping the current agricultural 
policy regime and the TPP-related debates. The paper concludes by highlighting some areas which appear to 
offer fertile ground for future research, including the role of ideas in policy-making.
 The basic problematique that these bodies of research collectively have sought to address is the fact that 
agricultural policy in Japan has not behaved in the manner that traditional economic or political science 
theory suggests it ‘should,’ particularly in the postwar period. For economists, the Hecksher-Ohlin model of 
international trade implies that Japan, as a land-scarce?? and capital- and (skilled) labour-abundant country 
should export capital- and (skilled) labour-intensive goods, while importing land-intensive goods, like 
agricultural products. Instead, Japan’s protectionist agricultural policy regime has resulted in a highly 
distorted market in agricultural products, in which many land-intensive crops, such as rice, are produced 
domestically at prices far above world market levels.
 Political scientists have sought to explain why the postwar policy regime has remained highly protectionist 
in nature, despite the agricultural sector’s declining economic importance (accounting in 2010 for 3.7% of 
employment and 1.2% of GDP; World Bank, 2013), and the high costs of maintaining protectionism in a 
stagnating economy. One measure of support for agriculture, the OECD’s Producer Support Estimate (PSE)??, 
estimates that government support in Japan accounts for 51% of farmers’ income, compared to 20% in the 
EU, 9% in the US, and 3% in Australia (OECD, 2013). The studies surveyed below have attempted to explain 
??? Japan is 72% mountainous (68% forested), with only 12.5% of total land area being suitable for agriculture. Its population density of 350 people 
per square kilometre is signifi cantly higher than world average of 53. Its arable land endowment ratio is 0.033 hectares of arable land per 
person, far below the world average of 0.200. In comparison, Australia has 2.14 hectares of arable land per person, the EU average is 0.21, and 
the United States 0.54 (World Bank, 2013).
??? PSE is defi ned as “the annual monetary value of gross transfers from consumers and taxpayers to agricultural producers, measured at the farm-
gate level, arising from policy measures that support agriculture, regardless of their nature, objectives or impacts on farm production or 
income.” Percentage PSE is “PSE as a share of gross farm receipts (including support).” (OECD 2009).
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both the origins of Japan’s contemporary agricultural policy and its continuation, with reference to both 
structural and institutional factors.
 In general, Japan’s agricultural sector and policy has received less academic attention than its industrial 
counterpart (e.g Johnson, 1982). Early English-language treatments of the sector included G. C. Allen’s A 
Short Economic History of Modern Japan, 1867-1937 (Allen, 1946), which provided a largely statistics-based 
account of changes in output for major agricultural products between the Meiji Reformation and the onset of 
the Pacifi cWar. Very high levels of industrial growth in the 1950s and 1960s conversely precipitated problems 
in the agricultural sector, which seemed to stimulate international interest in Japanese agriculture. Notably, 
Ronald P. Dore examined the postwar land reform policies and their effects on village life, writing from a 
sociological perspective (Dore, 1959).
 A significant and comprehensive contribution came in Agricultural Developments in Modern Japan, a 
multiple-authored work arising out of a symposium, and published in 1963 under the auspices of the UN’s 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (Ogura (ed.), 1963; 2000). Based on existing research published in 
Japanese during the 1950s, this volume aimed at explaining the economic development, legal framework and 
technical aspects of Japanese agriculture to an international audience, and offered policy-focused observations 
on the relevance of Japan’s agricultural experience to other Asian countries (Hunter, 2000, p. vii). A range of 
studies on agricultural productivity and development in Japan and other East Asian countries by the 
agricultural economist Yujiro Hayami (e.g. Hayami and Ruttan, 1970) further raised the international profi le 
of Japanese agricultural policy studies in the 1970s, but it wasn’t until the 1980s that Japan’s agricultural trade 
policies becomes established as a separate fi eld of study in the English-language academic literature, through 
the political economy work of Yujiro Hayami, Kim Anderson, Masayoshi Honma, and others. The Political 
Economy of Agricultural Protection (Anderson and Hayami, eds, 1986) and Japanese Agriculture Under Siege 
(Hayami, 1988) were among the foundational works. One of the contributors to the 1986 volume, Aurelia 
George Mulgan, subsequently developed an alternative approach from a political science framework, termed 
an “empirical-historical” approach. The following section offers explanations and critiques of both these 
approaches, before going on to consider more recent studies which take alternative approaches to explaining 
the puzzle of agricultural policy in Japan.
2. Four approaches to Japanese agricultural policy
2.1 The political economy approach: economic growth and structural change
 The assertion of proponents of political economy is that it can predict global patterns of agricultural 
distortion where traditional economic theories fail, by accounting for elements such as economic structural 
factors, and the ways in which structural changes impact on issues like the costs of distribution and distortions 
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arising from protection, the intensity of political activities, and the ability of groups to organise politically and 
influence governments (Swinnen, 2010). Political economists apply micro-economic and choice-theoretic 
approaches to the political marketplace. 
 From the mid-1980s, certain political economists began to analyse a puzzling empirical observation: that 
agriculture in poor, developing countries was taxed by governments, whereas in rich, developed countries, it 
received protection and subsidies. The fact that three rapidly-developing East Asian countries - Japan, Korea 
and Taiwan - had moved during the previous decades from being relatively poor but open to agricultural trade 
to being relatively rich yet pursing agricultural protectionism, just as many European countries had done in the 
nineteenth century, suggested that structural factors may have been at work (Anderson and Hayami, 1986, p. 
xi). Based on the East Asian experience and drawing on trade and development theory and a Downsian 
economic model of the political marketplace, Anderson et al developed an economic growth and structural 
change (EGSC) theory of agriculture in a developing economy. The theory is discussed in detail below.
 Approach
 The EGSC theory builds on a model of an economy with three factors of production (agricultural land, non-
farm capital, and intersectorally mobile labour) and two sectors (agriculture and manufacturing). Initially 
employed in food production, agricultural labour begins to move into the manufacturing sector as capital 
accumulates domestically or fl ows in from foreign investors. Eventually, some labour-intensive manufacturing 
sectors become internationally competitive, which changes the country’s trade pattern from solely agricultural 
exports in the direction of industrial exports and some agricultural imports. Three complexities are then 
introduced to make the model more realistic (a non-food primary sector, the need for capital in primary 
production, and a service sector), and the method by which each of these can contribute to agriculture’s 
further decline relative to other sectors as the economy grows is explained.
 Two conclusions are drawn: (1) that agriculture moves from being the most important economic sector in a 
poor economy eventually to become import-competing, with this process happening more rapidly in countries 
with poor land-endowments; and (2) that agricultural output and employment are likely to grow less quickly 
than industrial and service sectors in a growing economy, and thus will decline in relative importance. 
Furthermore, since the income elasticity of the demand for food is less than 1, the importance of food prices to 
(now mostly urban) consumers will decline, from a relatively high proportion, as income grows. In the initial 
period of industrialisation, the direct effect of food prices on urban unskilled workers (as part of the household 
budget) and their indirect effects (in terms of pushing up wages for unskilled agricultural workers) will cause 
urban employers to exert political pressure in order to keep food prices low. The necessity for this decreases 
as urban unskilled wage levels rise, making it less diffi cult for agricultural wage rates - and thus agricultural 
prices - to rise.
 To analyse the political effects of these structural changes, the EGSC theory then utilises an economic theory 
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of the political marketplace, after Downs (1957), in which political leaders design policy packages that 
maximise their chances of staying in power; individuals and groups who would expect to gain from a certain 
policy will lobby for it until the expected net benefi ts of further expenditure is zero; and those expected to lose 
from the policy will lobby against it until the expected marginal net return is zero (Anderson and Hayami, 
1986, p. 3).
 Applying this theory to the case of agriculture in a developing economy such as Japan’s, a number of points 
are made: (1) the relatively small size of industry, combined with tax collection ineffi ciencies and corruption 
problems, makes it impractical to supply protection to farmers at low levels of development; (2) education 
levels and geographical concentration in cities help industrial capital owners in lobbying government at low 
development levels (whereas lower transport and communications costs at higher development levels help 
farmers organise and lobby); (3) the free-rider problem in political lobbying is smaller for industry at lower 
development levels when there are fewer fi rms, making lobbying a more attractive proposition in that period; 
and (4) urban employers have an interest in lobbying to keep agricultural wages and prices low, since these 
affect urban unskilled workers directly and indirectly.
 The structural changes that result from economic development alter the incentives for groups seeking or 
opposing protectionism, shifting the balance towards those in favour of protectionism so that agricultural 
protection now becomes politically viable. In an advanced economy, the percentage of the labour force 
employed in agriculture is small relative to industry, and urban workers’ budgets are less sensitive to food 
prices, so agricultural protection becomes economically viable; agricultural protectionism can be provided by 
less visible means, through import restrictions; and food security, food self-suffi ciency and similar concerns 
can reduce the political cost of providing agricultural support.
 While accepting that the given model “is premised on a highly simplifi ed description of the political process” 
(Anderson and Hayami, 1986, p. 16), Anderson argues that the model has explanatory value, since it produces 
four hypotheses about the changing political economy of protectionism in developing economies: (1) that 
distortionary price and trade policies are biased against agriculture in poor agrarian economies; (2) that policy 
bias gradually shifts to favour agriculture as the economy grows, particularly if growth is accompanied by 
declining comparative advantage for agriculture; (3) the switch to favour food producers occurs at a lower 
level of per capita income in countries with less comparative advantage in food production; and, (4) the 
switch will take place more rapidly with faster economic growth and a more rapid decline in the comparative 
advantage of food production.
 The subsequent studies in this strand of literature fi nd evidence for these hypotheses, and summarise the fi ve 
characteristics of an open, growing economy that explain the shift from taxing to assisting agriculture: (1) the 
declining importance of agriculture as an employer, in relative and subsequently absolute terms; (2) 
agriculture’s declining share of GNP; (3) the decreasing importance of farm prices in non-farm households’ 
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expenditure and real wages; (4) the decline in agricultural comparative advantage and food self-suffi ciency for 
almost all countries; and (5) the decrease in transportation and communication costs for rural areas that 
accompanies development (Anderson and Hayami, 1986, p. 112).
 Critique
 This theory and body of work has been of great importance in developing the fi eld of study of the political 
economy of agricultural protection in general, and Japan’s protectionist agricultural policy in particular. The 
high degree of fi t between the the economic growth and structural change model’s predictions and observed 
global patterns of sectoral bias is so close that the approach must be taken seriously (Moore, 1993, pp. 105-
106). However, the model contains a number of short-comings. Some of these relate to the exclusion of 
important political actors from the model, others to the assumptions made in the model.
 One criticism from political scientists is that the theory fails to fi t observed historical experience in particular 
periods in each of the countries from which it was developed: Japan, Korea and Taiwan (Moore, 1993; 
Mulgan, 2000). Another is that the approach offers a poor account of the state as a political actor and of the 
policy choices of various actors (Moore, 1993, p. 110). Thirdly, it has been argued that by taking the nominal 
rate of protection (essentially, the rice tariff) as a proxy for the real rate of protection, the approach 
underestimates other kinds of government assistance to the agricultural sector, such as through the agricultural 
associations and cooperatives (Mulgan, forthcoming). More fundamentally, there is an accusation of 
ideological bias, that “Anderson and Hayami are not political scientists, but neo-classical economists seeking 
intellectual and empirical support for a particular line in economic policy: reductions in the high levels of 
agricultural protection prevalent in East Asia” (Moore, 1993, p. 94).
 For economists (and, by extension, political economists), theoretical models “should be tested primarily by 
the accuracy of their predictions rather than by the reality of their assumptions” (Downs, 1957, p. 21); even 
when incorrect, they can offer insights and methods for problem solving, allowing quantifi cation, calculation, 
and verifi cation (Varian, 1989). Vogel (1999, p. 201) notes that “as theorists from Milton Friedman to Kenneth 
Waltz have stressed, assumptions in and of themselves are not right or wrong, but rather useful or not useful.” 
Engaging critically with the economic growth and structural change theory on its own terms, one can still fi nd 
shortcomings and ways in which the model can be revised and improved. Three areas in particular stand out: 
(1) over-simplifi cation of the original Downsian economic model of politics, such that some of the underlying 
logic has been lost; (2) the need to refi ne the Downsian model of the political market-place, growing out of 
the Grossman-Helpman literature on the political economy of trade policy (Grossman and Helpman, 1994); 
and (3) the failure of certain predictions from the Anderson-Hayami literature, including the prediction that 
there should be a structural turning point in the success of demands for protection as agriculture declines when 
agriculture’s share of the labour force was 4-5% or when its share of GDP was 3-4% (Honma, 1993). The 
present values are 3.7% and 1.2% respectively, but there has been no signifi cant decline in protectionism in 
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Japan. Taken together, these critiques from both outside and inside perspectives support the view that 
reassessment of the theory is appropriate, and that other approaches are worth considering.
2.2 The empirical-historical approach
 An alternative approach to Japan’s agricultural policy regime is the “empirical-historical” approach, which 
aims to construct a factual account of Japanese agriculture without necessarily erecting a theoretical 
framework around it. Although it may not be appropriate to describe it as a “theory,” it does amount to a 
separate model of Japanese agriculture, in which interest-groups play a central role in infl uencing policy to 
their own benefi t, and in which there exist complex and multifaceted relationships between the holders of 
power and those who seek to infl uence them, both from within governmental structures and from without. 
This approach has been developed by Mulgan, who articulates is as a “traditional, political science 
perspective,” in which
societal groupings (defi ned in terms of their membership of particular political, institutional, social or 
economic organisations or categories) are broadly conceived as pursuing their interests in politics; and 
the extent to which the interests of any particular societal grouping are realised will depend on the 
relative power of these groups (Mulgan, 2000, p. 37).
 Approach
 At the core of this approach is the view, similar to Johnson (1982), that Japan is inherently an interventionist 
state, and that agricultural protectionism represents one manifestation of this. At the same time, the political 
system exhibits interest group pluralism and organisational heterogeneity (Mulgan, 2000, p. 39). In this 
account, the devil is always in the detail, and in Japan’s agricultural policy regime, the devil has three horns: 
the agricultural ministry, the agricultural co-operative organisation Nokyo, and politicians.
 The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) plays a central role in policy formation as well 
as policy implementation. The MAFF derives its power, status, and fi nancial resources from implementing a 
complex regime of protectionist policies which both sustain and perpetuate an ineffi cient, small-scale farming 
sector. MAFF bureaucrats follow a path of “intervention maximisation,” because of the fi nancial and status 
benefi ts that this brings both to the ministry and the individuals involved. For these individuals, a signifi cant 
proportion of their total career earnings comes from lucrative post-retirement amakudari jobs in gaikaku 
dantai (semi-governmental affi liated agencies) created by the ministry itself or private companies who benefi t 
from rural public works projects (Mulgan, 2005).
 The MAFF’s intervention-maximising calculus determines its priorities and positions on a range of issues 
(Mulgan, 2006, p. 20). Thus, agricultural protectionism is as much a supply-driven process on the 
bureaucratic side as a demand-driven process on the farmers’ side. The MAFF has been successful in 
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achieving its primary goal, “to protect and preserve the ineffi cient, small-scale, family-based, land-holding 
system… it wants a viable but dependent farm sector, one requiring bureaucratic intervention in order to 
survive.” (Mulgan, 2006, p. 130). Maximal intervention creates a “web of vested interests” (Mulgan, 2006, p. 
150): for farmers, who receive many economic and political goods; for Nokyo, who receive monopoly rents; 
for the LDP (when in power), who received votes, support, and help; for the gaikaku dantai, whose existence 
depends entirely on high levels of ministry spending; and for private fi rms, such as construction fi rms, who 
often end up benefi tting more than do farmers, from the pork of rural infrastructure spending.
 Farmers have held a disproportionately high (and self-perpetuating) degree of political infl uence. In light of 
the small-scale, mechanised, largely part-time nature of farming in Japan, farmers have sought and received 
high levels of subsidies. The vehicle through which this has been achieved is Nokyo (known in English as 
‘Japan Agriculture,’ or ‘JA’), the multi-faceted, multi-functional agricultural cooperative organisation 
(combining pressure-group, electoral, governmental, industrial, distributive, retail, and banking functions), 
which has deeply entrenched interests and is a powerful advocate against reforming the protectionist regime. 
Nokyo grew out of government-organised co-operatives in the prewar period, and in the postwar years gained 
a privileged position in relation both to the government and the farmers. In addition to its role of pressure 
group claiming to represent farming interests politically, it was an agent for the implementation of agricultural 
policy, a monopoly provider of all manner of agricultural inputs, a provider of banking services and credit, a 
monopsony purchaser of rice, and a political kingmaker at the local level, among other functions.
 Through this combination of activities, Nokyo grew immensely wealthy and politically powerful - although 
it also became increasingly reliant on the LDP’s distribution of largess - and though it is no longer what it 
once was, its political power and capacity to organise the rural vote declining somewhat since the 1990s, it 
remains a credible and influential political actor, actively and (so far) successfully opposing proposed 
liberalisation measures flowing from recent FTA negotiations. The fact that Nokyo can and does operate 
simultaneously in the administrative sphere as an auxiliary government agency, in the political marketplace as 
an interest group, and in the Diet and political parties through the activities of its executive leaders means that 
it is difficult to fit it into standard Western categorisations such as ‘interest group,’ ‘lobby,’ or the public/
private dichotomy (Mulgan, 2000, p. xviii). The ability of Nokyo and other farming organisations to organise 
and direct the farm vote has been important in increasing its coherence and strength (Mulgan, 2000, p. 471). 
Although the farming population has declined quite steadily in recent years, farmers’ political power was 
declining only very gradually - in part because the urban vote, though increasing in number, lacks the 
electoral coherence of the rural vote.
 Politicians have traditionally chosen policy regimes which favour farming and rural interests, even at 
signifi cant costs to consumers and urban voters, because of the value of the farming vote as a large, stable 
electoral base. The failure to reform electoral districts after mass urban migration in the postwar decades 
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resulted in electoral misapportionment, making securing the rural vote of central importance for any party 
wanting to win power. Mulgan asserts that most important factors in this regard have been the absolute size of 
the national agricultural electorate, the magnitude of the electoral bias in favour of farm votes, and the extent 
to which the LDP was dependent on these votes. The seniority system of promotion in the political hierarchy 
meant that politicians with stable agricultural support bases could, by virtue of longevity (rather than ability), 
rise to positions of infl uence in government, and implement further policies advantageous to rural interests 
(Mulgan, 2000, p. 377).
 In this view, the origins of postwar agricultural protectionism lie, not simply in changing welfare payoffs to 
different sectors as Japan’s economy industrialised, but in institutional and policy precedents established in the 
fi rst half of the twentieth century. The postwar agricultural cooperative movement and its many functions have 
roots in the prewar tradition of intermediary agricultural organisations such as nokai and sangyou kumiai 
(government-linked agricultural cooperative organisations), and Nokyo continues to function in organising 
and delivering votes to Diet members (Mulgan, 2000, p. 380-81). The legal framework on which postwar 
agricultural policy has been built also has prewar origins. For example, the Food Control system, which 
became a policy cornerstone of the postwar years, was established as a temporary war measure in 1942.
 Some of the main conclusions of the empirical-historical approach are as follows:
 (1) the electoral power and political strength of the farmers and their lobby-group gives them a very 
signifi cant infl uence over policy-makers, and in particular helped shape the pro-rural, anti-urban bias of the 
LDP in the postwar era; (2) in terms of the organisation of farmers’ interests and their access to politicians, the 
system is “strongly pluralist”; (3) “interest-groups’ penetration of political institutions is counterbalanced by 
bureaucratic penetration of interest groups through corporatist models of interaction, with varying degrees of 
state sponsorship and interest group capture,” which is consistent with corporate modes of interaction seen in 
certain Western European and North American states; (4) institutional interest groups (gaikaku dantai) go 
beyond their foundational administrative functions to seek to defend and expand their own powers; (5) the 
existence of so many statutory and institutional interest groups has itself institutionalised the protectionist 
regime, increasing the political costs of reform and acting as a bulwark against it; (6) the organisational 
foundations of agricultural support refl ect and reify the nature of small-scale, family-farm based nature of 
agricultural production, so that production and protection are deeply interlinked (Mulgan, 2000, 645-647).
 Critique
 Just as the revisionist accounts of Japan’s apparent uniqueness by Johnson, van Wolferen, Fallows, 
Prestowitz and others in the 1980s and 1990s were countered with evidence that its political system shared 
fundamental similarities with other systems, so too is there evidence that the empirical-historical account of 
the uniqueness of aspects of Japan’s agricultural policy regime may be overstated. The cases of Taiwan and 
Korea provide useful evidence. Moore highlights Taiwan’s Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction 
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(JCRR), a sort of substitute agricultural ministry, which controlled most agricultural investment, undertook 
planning and policy-making, implemented policies through other agencies, whose employees sought to 
maintain their commission’s special status and whose salaries were much higher than those of regular 
bureaucrats (Moore, 1990, pp. 101-102, 109). While it was not an exact analogue of Japan’s MAFF, the JCRR 
clearly shared some functions which went beyond what would be expected of ‘regular’ agricultural ministries. 
Korea also had a system of retiring bureaucrats fi nding second careers in organisations active in the sector in 
which the bureaucrats had formerly worked (Moore, 1990), a practice that sounds identical to the Japanese 
practice of amakudari. Thus, it seems fruitful to look for partial (if not complete) analogues in the agricultural 
regimes in other countries, and use these to identify conceptual commonalities between Japan on other 
countries.
 Secondly, eschewing theory-constructing aspirations has the effect of placing limits on the ability to use the 
findings relating to Japan’s agricultural experience to draw broader conclusions about the way the world 
works, in terms of the political and economic phenomena at play in giving rise to and maintaining 
protectionist agricultural policy.
 Thirdly, while drawing attention to the need for a “complex multifactoral account of the diverse political, 
historical, economic, bureaucratic, ideological and other factors involved” (Mulgan, 2000, p. 1) in Japanese 
agricultural policy, Mulgan’s own work focuses largely on the actions of policy-makers and interest groups, 
and does not deal in signifi cant detail with certain other infl uences that can be investigated within “traditional 
political science,” such as ideational factors. 
 As such, the empirical-historical approach has produced an important body of research, giving rise to its own 
account of Japan’s agricultural policy system, but there remains space for future research to focus on factors 
not treated in detail thus far, and to do so in a way that is more comparative and theoretic in aspiration.
2.3 Policy preference approaches
 The two approaches considered in detail so far offer accounts of agricultural policy development and policy-
making with specifi c reference to structural factors (political economy) and institutional factors (empirical-
historical). This section examines literature which offers important insights into attitudes and preferences 
regarding agricultural policy from the perspective of voters or consumers. The studies range from political 
science to economics, and some of the research is interdisciplinary in nature.
 Steven K. Vogel (1999) studied the policy preferences of Japanese consumer groups from a political science 
perspective, and suggested that they offered a “cautionary tale” to those who assume that preferences can be 
deduced a priori through assumptions about economic interests. The consumer groups studied had “repeatedly 
advocated policy positions at odds with their basic material interests in lower prices, higher fi nancial returns, 
greater choice, and a more efficient system” (Vogel, 1999, p. 187). They had not only failed to promote 
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important liberalisation or deregulation, but had been quite successful in opposing them. Consumer groups 
fought vigorously against US pressure for agricultural liberalisation in the 1980s on the grounds that it would 
undermine food self-sufficiency, increase the risk of contamination or disease, and threaten farmers’ 
livelihoods (Vogel, 1999, p. 193). This research suggested that Japanese consumers have distinct preferences, 
and discounted price as a factor in making both political and economic decisions. In politics, they discount 
price relative to other concerns such as environmental protection, social stability, and fairness in competition 
(Vogel, 1999, p. 195). Vogel linked this to modern Japan’s historical experience, in which governments sought 
to convince consumers to sacrifi ce short-term interests like lower prices in favour of national goals such as 
economic growth, military strength, and postwar recovery. In addition, consumer groups’ behaviour was 
infl uenced by allegiances with other groups including farm groups forged through participation in national 
campaigns and other activities, and they also had a tendency to identify with perceived ‘weak’ groups like 
farmers as their allies (defined against perceived ‘strong’ groups like big businesses and foreign 
governments). Vogel argued for a broader understanding of rational behaviour, and cautioned against 
assuming, rather than empirically proving, the link between economic interests and preferences.
 Seeking to explain the differences in attitudes towards free trade between economists (who almost 
universally favour free trade) and general public opinion (among whom 60% or more express anti-trade 
sentiment in opinion polls??), the economists Anna Maria Mayda and Dani Rodrik (2005) studied why certain 
people and countries are more protectionist than others, and found that attitudes towards trade are infl uenced 
by a complex set of determinants, both economic and non-economic in nature. One important factor was 
educational attainment and skill: highly educated individuals in countries with high levels of human capital 
tended to be pro-trade, although highly educated individuals in countries with low human capital levels 
tended to be against trade. Trade exposure of an individual’s employment sector was important, with those in 
non-traded sectors likely to be the most pro-trade, while those in sectors with comparative disadvantage were 
on average more protectionist. Relative economic status also mattered, with those who identifi ed themselves 
as “upper class” being significantly more pro-trade. Finally, non-economic determinants, such as values, 
identities and attachments, “play a very important role in explaining variation in preferences over trade” 
(Mayda and Rodrik, 2005). Neighbourhood attachment and nationalism/patriotism were associated with 
protectionist tendencies, while “cosmopolitanism” was correlated with pro-trade sentiments.
 Studying US consumers, Mansfi eld and Mutz (2009) found that individuals’ attitudes to trade were formed 
sociotropically and infl uenced by media and elite discourse, rather than being determined by an individual’s 
occupation. Building on this, and with reference to Japan, Naoi and Kume (2011) conducted a survey study 
that investigated individuals’ expressed policy preferences after they had been primed by visual stimuli to 
??? While these fi gures refer to the US, similar percentages were reported in surveys of public opinion in Japan. See Vogel (1999, 193).
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consider their roles either as consumers or producers. Consumer role-focused priming was found to have no 
effect, but producer role-focused priming was found to increase respondents’ opposition to food imports. This 
effect was particularly strong among individuals who themselves felt job insecurity, creating what the authors 
termed a “coalition of losers” between producers and consumers that sustains protection for uncompetitive 
sectors (Naoi and Kume, 2011, p. 791). Further investigation examined two possible mechanisms by which 
these sentiments might be conveyed: sympathy for farmers, and projection of the respondents’ own job 
insecurity. It was found that projection was statistically signifi cant.
2.4 Food security and governmentality
 One of the most recent studies relating to Japan’s agricultural policy is narrower in scope (focusing only on 
fi shing policy), yet it broadens the research fi eld in a signifi cant new direction, by using ideas as a central 
explanatory variable. It also offers a possible way to bridge the divide between structural and institutional 
accounts and individual preference-based explanations. Barclay and Epstein (2013) examine “the underlying 
rationale with which Japan has framed, justifi ed and garnered support for its food security policies” (Barclay 
and Epstein, 2013, p. 223). The study begins by highlighting a fundamental paradox: Japan is a proponent and 
beneficiary of free trade regimes, yet clings stubbornly to protectionist policies to protect its agricultural 
sector, with “food security”?? often cited as the justifi cation of this.
 The authors then undertake an analysis based on Michel Foucault’s idea of governmentality, which is a 
counterpart to the traditional concept of sovereignty (that is, securing a territory and a population); 
governmentality and sovereignty are represented as the two conceptual poles that frame the range of the 
modern (neoliberal) state’s activities. Governmentality aims to capture the expanded functions of the modern 
state and the ways in which it has progressively penetrated the economy. One aspect of this is biopower, 
referring to the idea that the government has the power and the role to intervene and enhance the life of its 
citizens. Governmentality gives rise to an account of the historical trajectory of the liberalisation of food 
markets (in Europe, but transferable to Japan) that is quite similar to the economic growth and structural 
change account, but which also accounts for the move towards autarchy in the 1930s (Barclay and Epstein, 
2013, pp. 218, 220).
 The idea of food security in a modern state, the authors contend, resonates strongly in contemporary politics 
because it “mobilises both sovereignty and governmentality.”
 Towards the sovereignty pole, it accounts for the framing of the issue in terms of security, because it 
illuminates a state that continues to cater to its traditional sovereignty obligations to secure a population 
??? As the authors note, at the WTO and in general discourse, “food security” means simply the ability of an individual to access suffi cient food as 
to exist on a daily basis; the source of the food is not considered. A distinct concept is “food self suffi ciency,” meaning the ability of a country 
to domestically produce enough food to feed its population. In policy discourse in Japan, “food security” and “food self-suffi ciency” are 
equated to mean the same thing.
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against, in this case, insuffi cient food supplies within the territory. Towards the governmentality pole, 
food as an area of governmental intervention constitutes both a productive sector of the economy in its 
own right, and one that hailed more fundamentally the chief purpose of governmentality, enhancing the 
population’s productive capacities. (Barclay and Epstein, 2013, p. 219).
 Echoing the empirical-historical view, the authors note that gaikaku dantai in the fi sheries sector carried out 
functions that in many other countries would have been done by the government, such as the regulation of 
fisheries, and also functions that might elsewhere have been done by the private sector, including human 
resources and payroll services for fi shing companies (Barclay and Epstein, 2013, p. 220).
 These ideas about food security have traction because, however instrumentally they may have been 
used by some actors, the ideas themselves are credibly in the public interest, and capture the concerns of 
many people beyond those who cynically benefi t from practices carried out in the name of those ideas. In 
other words, they tap into deeper governmentality rationales underpinning the modern Japanese state. 
(Barclay and Epstein, 2013, p. 228)
 Thus, in this view, the idea of government intervention to provide food for the nation becomes an essential 
element of the basic conception of the role of the modern state. In the Japanese context, the quasi-
governmental functions of the gaikaku dantai in the fi sheries sector (which have very close equivalents in the 
agricultural sector as a whole) means that the idea of government intervention in this sector is deeply 
entrenched from a historical perspective. And from a contemporary perspective, the idea of food security 
resonates with broader conceptions of the national interest. This message is re-enforced consistently by 
politicians, agricultural bureaucrats, prominent non-governmental organisations, and in the media at large.
3. Conclusion: summary, and future research
 This paper has critically reviewed two major strands of literature on Japanese agricultural policy, as well as 
some recent research which offers new perspectives in understanding and explaining the persistence of 
protectionism in Japan, despite the fact that this policy course reduces both the national economic welfare and 
the individual welfare of voters and consumers who have continued to support these policies, explicitly or 
implicitly.
 The political economy approach pioneered by Anderson, Hayami et al is a rational-choice based theory of 
economic growth and structural change, in which agricultural policy has changed in response to sectoral 
change during Japan’s economic development. Policy-makers set policies according to the political 
marketplace model, in response to the demands of sectoral interests. Agriculture provided the main source of 
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tax revenue when Japan was at a low level of development, but after the rapid industrialisation of the 
economy in the postwar era, now-relatively impoverished farmers had an increased incentive to demand 
protectionist policies, and the reduced economic cost of providing it (as well as a perceived benefi t in terms of 
social stabilisation of rural areas during an era of rapid urban migration) led the owners of capital to acquiesce 
and allow politicians to satisfy these demands. This approach offers a logical (if, at times, imperfectly fi tted) 
account of the historical trajectory of agricultural policy in modern Japan, and one which may be applied to 
other rapidly industrialising economies, like Korea and Taiwan. However, this theory fares poorly in 
accounting for the continuation of protectionism in contemporary Japan. The costs now signifi cantly outweigh 
any perceived benefi ts, and Japanese agriculture’s employment and GDP share levels are well past the point 
where this theory predicted that protectionism would wane.
 The empirical-historical account pioneered by Mulgan explains the postwar agricultural policy regime in 
terms of the intense and successful lobbying efforts of a range of interest groups - in particular, Nokyo (Japan 
Agriculture) and the agricultural ministry (MAFF) itself. In this account, there has been ‘institutional capture,’ 
with the capturing groups including non-governmental organisations (primarily Nokyo), the agricultural 
ministry itself, and the semi-governmental gaikaku dantai (affiliated organisations). This approach has 
revealed a large amount of data about particular features of the agricultural policy regime in Japan, and 
implies that the protectionist regime and the small scale of farming in Japan are together self-perpetuating. 
However, the approach does not offer a formal theoretical model, and its deep focus on one country seems to 
come at the cost of comparative applicability. In addition, there has not yet been detailed treatment of some of 
the factors deemed to be important explanatory variables, most notably ideas. Both the political economy and 
the empirical historical approaches explain Japanese agricultural policy in terms of the actions of policy-
makers and sectional interest groups, and concern collective action problems involving well-organised interest 
groups who capture agricultural policy, doing so against the economic welfare of voters and consumers.
 In contrast, the policy preference determinants studies examined in Section 2.3 shed light on individual 
preferences regarding agricultural policy in Japan. This is essential in explaining why individuals - both as 
voters and as consumers - explicitly or implicitly favour protectionist agricultural policies that reduce their 
own economic welfare??. These (mostly) more recent studies share a more nuanced approach to policy 
preferences, and the multiple and complex factors which shape them. Individuals are not automatons whose 
policy preferences are determined in a Marxian fashion by material interests. Usually, they are producers as 
well as consumers, and their opinions and policy preferences are influenced to various degrees by their 
education level, sector of employment, food safety issues, environmental concerns, social concerns, and even 
projection of feelings of job insecurity onto others - in this case, farmers, whom they perceive as being in a 
??? Naoi and Kume (2011, p. 772) found that 55 % of Japanese people thought that import liberalisation of agricultural products should not be 
accepted “in order to maintain Japanese manufacturing exports,” while only 38% believed that agricultural imports should be liberalised.
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similar situation. Indeed, attitudes towards trade are not necessarily fi xed, and can be changed by priming an 
individual to focus on one of their roles or concerns rather than another.
 Finally, the food security and governmentality approach discussed in Section 2.4 argues that government 
intervention to secure food supplies has such strong resonance because it fulfi ls both traditional sovereignty-
related notions of the role of government to provide security to the nation (in this case, security from food 
shortages), and also the modern governmentality-related notions about the role of government to enhance 
what is termed the ‘life-capacity’ and productive potential of the nation through economic intervention. This 
approach incorporates the institutional capture described in the empirical-historical approach, but suggests 
that the broad consensus among policy-makers and the general population in Japan in relation to agricultural 
protectionism can only fully be explained through reference to the role of ideas.
 As I hope this survey has shown, the fi eld of Japanese agricultural policy studies is an extremely fertile one 
at present. The two major approaches have served well in explaining many of the features of the historical 
development and ongoing continuation of protectionism in Japan, but neither fully explains the entire picture. 
The policy preferences approaches could be advanced by further studies into the determinants of preferences 
to confi rm the fi ndings of Naoi and Kume (2011), and by their replication in less ethnically and culturally 
homogenous societies (Japan being perhaps the most homogenous of all nations in these regards). More 
broadly, developments in this strand of literature may have signifi cant implications for how we assess if a 
policy is ‘rational,’ given that deductively assuming individual policy preferences purely through economic 
welfare calculations no longer seems satisfactory. Finally, the food security and governmentality approach 
offers a possible bridge between structural and institutional accounts and individual policy preference 
explanations. Although this work is based so far on only one paper, it builds on the foundations of two more 
established fi elds of study - governmentality on one hand, the empirical-historical strand on the other. The 
fi ndings with respect to the fi shing sector amount to a very convincing argument. This study opens the door 
for further work on the role of ideas in policy-making in Japan, and to the extension of this approach to the 
whole of Japan’s agricultural sector, beyond fi shing. In particular, exploring the idea of rice, which seems to 
have a strong resonance in policy debates, could prove fruitful.
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